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The Proposed Corporate Sponsorship
Regulations:
Is The Treasury Department "Sleeping With The
Enemy?"
David A.
I. Introduction
In 1993, the Treasury Department (the
Treasury)' issued a proposed regulation
outlining when money received by a charity from
a corporate sponsor would be subject to federal
income tax.2 In defining the phrase "trade or
business,"3 the proposed regulation addresses the
extent to which sponsorship payments to
charities will be treated by the Treasury as
having been made in return for advertising on
behalf of the sponsor, thus subjecting the
payment to income tax.4 In the proposed
regulation, the Treasury concludes that a
charity's use of a corporate sponsor's name in
the title of a charitable event is a mere
acknowledgment and, thus, no advertising trade
or business exists.5 However, if the charity -
as a condition of accepting the sponsor's money
- displays the sponsor's slogan at the event, an
advertising trade or business exists to the extent
that the slogan promotes the sponsor's product
or service.'
Curiously, the Treasury's examples of
acknowledgments in the proposed regulation do
not logically follow from its regulatory definition
of acknowledgment. For instance, the proposed
regulation indicates that displaying a sponsor's
product at a charitable event, or providing free
samples to patrons, is not advertising; rather, it
is an acknowledgment of the sponsor's gift.
However, the definition of advertising in the
proposed regulation states, in part, that
"[a]dvertising includes any activity which
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promotes or markets any... product," [unless,
of course, it is classified as an acknowledgment].
" Could giving away free samples of a product
ever be non-promotional for the seller of that
product? A rose by any other name is still a rose
- is it not? This is only one of the various
examples indicating that, at least with respect to
sponsorship payments, the Treasury is biased in
favor of charities when classifying a sponsorship
payment as for either advertising or
acknowledgment funds.8
What makes this situation even more
preposterous, and rather revealing, is that the
Treasury took the exact opposite position for
several years preceding the proposed regulation.
In its pre-1993 position, the Treasury was of the
opinion that a charity's promotion of an event
sponsor, much less the sponsor's product, is
necessarily a taxable advertising business
activity. Why the change in position? Why is
the Treasury now proposing a regulation which
will make life much easier for charities? Why is
the Treasury agreeing to forego much-needed
revenue so that charities could benefit? The
most likely unstated rationale is that the Treasury
caved-in to political pressure from both
Congress and the charitable community.'
From a policy standpoint, the proposed
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regulation obviously goes too far - at least
farther than what a fully informed populous
would expect.'" If finalized, it will likely divert
significant advertising revenues of businesses
away from traditional advertising media such as
non-public radio, newspaper, and television.
Consequently, to the extent that these diverted
dollars are treated by the Treasury as for
"acknowledgments," as opposed to
"advertisements," the Treasury will likely lose
significant tax dollars." Additionally, several
tax practitioners and academics have suggested
that the proposed regulation is an indication that
the Treasury has "capitulated to college football
bowls, museums, and symphonies."' 2 Granted,
the proposed regulation represents bad policy
making by the Treasury. Does bad policy-
making mean that the Treasury acted beyond its
legal bounds? Specifically, if finalized, will the
proposed regulation represent an improper
regulatory interpretation by the Treasury of the
statutory term "trade or business?"
Although this political pandering by the
Treasury to taxpayers is clearly bad policy, the
Treasury's action is perfectly legal. Analysis of
relevant Supreme Court cases reveals that a
federal agency's interpretation of a term or issue
that Congress has failed to address in legislation
will be upheld if reasonable. Indeed, treasury
regulations reviewed by the Supreme Court are
customarily invalidated only when Congress has
defined the statutory term or issue addressed by
the regulation. Here, Congress has not defined
the term "advertising," nor the term "trade or
business." Thus, the Treasury's interpretation
would likely be upheld as a valid exercise of
regulatory authority.
Part II of this article will outline the
historical development of this so-called
unrelated business income tax on charities. Part
III will show, in detail, how the Treasury's
position in the proposed regulation represents a
sharp departure from its pre-1993 interpretations
regarding the status of sponsorship payments and
posit possible reasons for the change. Part IV
shows that the Treasury's "new" position on
sponsorship payments, while an example of poor
policy-making in light of the historical
development of the unrelated business income
tax, is legally defensible. Finally, part V
suggests that the Treasury, in light of the policy
concerns, should not finalize the proposed
regulation. Instead, the Treasury should revert
to its original position that sponsorship payments
are unrelated business income if the payments
amount to a "quid pro quo."
II. Historical Rationales For The Income
Tax on Charities
A. Introduction to the Income Tax on
Charities
Before one can fully grasp the essence of
what the Treasury has done in this proposed
regulation, analysis of the historical development
of the "special" income tax on charities is in
order. Through such analysis, it becomes all too
apparent that Congress had specific reasons for
placing limits on what charities can do without
bearing the burden of paying an income tax. The
primary reason for the congressional limitation
on charities is alleviation of potential economic
competitive advantage for charities over non-
charitable tax-paying businesses engaged in
commercial (i.e., trade or business) activities.
B. The Origin of Charities
Prior to the imposition of a corporate
income tax in .1894, all entities were exempt
from federal tax by virtue of statutory omission.
However, with the advent of the flat two percent
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corporate income tax in 1894, § 32 of the Tariff
Act of 1894 provided for the first modem-day
statutory tax exemption. This early tax
exemption applied to entities such as charities,
churches, and schools. These exemptions
continued, in a modified form, through
enactment of the Revenue Act of 1913, which
imposed the first constitutional federal income
tax.' 3
Today, a wide variety of entities enjoy
statutory exemption from the federal income tax,
including charities, churches, and schools; farm
cooperatives; political organizations; and
homeowners associations. 4 A great number of
tax-exempt organizations (i.e., churches,
charities and most schools and governmental
entities) enjoy the added benefit of the right to
receive tax-deductible contributions. 5  This
latter benefit is bestowed primarily on those tax-
exempt "public benefit organizations" described
in § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.' 6
C. Historical Development of the
Unrelated Business Income Tar on
Charities
Since their statutory creation in the early
part of the twentieth century, charities have
enjoyed a blanket exemption from federal
income tax. However, in 1950 Congress
correctly perceived that some charities were
abusing their beneficial status.
One example of this abuse occured in
1947, a corporation (X-corp), by using their
exemption to realize economic profit at the
expense of taxable competitors, organized to
benefit a tax-exempt law school, acquired all of
the outstanding stock of a taxable macaroni
maker that later merged into X-corp. Congress
sought to end such abuse through enactment of
the unrelated business income tax (ubit) in
1950."7 Thereafter, the macaroni maker was
operated exclusively for the benefit of X-corp
and, accordingly, paid its profits over to the law
school.' Under the Supreme Court's now-
abandoned destination of income test, the
destination of a tax-exempt organization's
income was considered to be of greater
consequence than the source and use of the
income for purposes of determining exemption.19
Thus, even though the macaroni maker sold the
same product both before and after the merger,
its income from sales after the merger was
exempt from federal income tax because all
profits were paid to the law school - a charity.
Because of this exemption, the macaroni maker
could realize a larger profit from each dollar of
revenue than could a similar macaroni maker
whose income was not exempt from the income
tax. Therefore, by virtue of the laws of tax
exemption, the macaroni maker had an unfair
economic commercial advantage over its taxable
competitor, prompting Congress to enact the ubit
in 1950. With few exceptions, today's ubit
applies to all charities. 20
D. Operation of the Unrelated Business
Income Tax
The main purpose of the ubit is to
minimize the degree of unfair commercial
advantage of charities over non-charities caused
by tax-exemption.2' The ubit attempts to
accomplish this goal in various sections of
Chapter 26 of the U.S. Code by taxing certain
income generated by charities to the same extent
that such income would be taxed if generated by
a taxable non-charitable competitor engaged in
a similar commercial activity. Section 511
imposes the ubit on the "unrelated business
taxable income" of charities.22 Section 512
defines "unrelated business taxable income,"
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generally, as gross income derived from any
unrelated and regularly carried on "trade or
business," less any directly attributable
expenses.23 Finally, § 513 provides that an
unrelated trade or business is any "trade or
business" which is not substantially related to the
exercise or performance of an organization's tax
exempt purpose.24
E. The Treasury's Three-Part Test for
Determining When Charities Owe
Income Tax
In accordance with the statutory framework
of subchapter F, the Treasury has promulgated
regulations which outline a three-part test for
determining when an amount of money received
by a charity is subject to tax. Under this test, it
must be established that (1) a trade or business
produced income, (2) the trade or business is
regularly conducted, and (3) the trade or
business is unrelated to the charity's exempt
function.' Thus, unless an exception26  or
modification27 applies, a charity with taxable
income"s satisfying this three-part test is
obligated to pay the unrelated business income
tax.
The trade or business element, which is the
primary focus of this article, requires that a §
162 "trade or business" produce income.29
Although § 162 does not explicitly define the
phrase "trade or business," the term is generally
understood in tax law as referring to an activity
entered into for profit.30 Thus, pursuant to the
regulations, when a charity mails low cost
articles incident to its solicitation of charitable
contributions, no § 513 trade or business activity
has occurred.3  Presumably, mailing such
articles is done without any requirement that
they be returned (or paid for) or that a
contribution be made by the recipient. The lack
of such conditions surrounding mail-outs
indicates a predominant intent to receive
contributions instead of to sell the items.
The second requirement of the three-part
test is that the trade or business activity be
"regularly carried on."32 In determining if a
trade or business activity is regularly carried on,
the regulations provide that the focus should be
on the frequency and continuity with which the
trade or business activity is conducted and the
manner in which it is pursued.3
In light of the purpose of the ubit to
equalize tax treatment of competing charitable
and non-charitable businesses, comparison of
frequency and manner is usually made with
reference to similar taxable business activities.
For example, the publication of advertisements
in an event program may not be regularly carried
on because of the infrequency of the event and,
correspondingly, the publication of the
advertisements. However, systematic and
consistent promotion of the event annually may
result in a finding that the advertising trade or
business is "regularly carried on."' Presumably,
this is because the type of advertising and the
efforts utilized in producing the advertisements,
potentially, takes business away from taxable
advertising competitors such as newspapers,
magazines, and radio.35
The third requirement, that the trade or
business be "unrelated," is satisfied if the trade
or business is not substantially related to the
charity's exempt purpose.36 Here, a comparison
is made of the causal relationship between the
trade or business activity that generated the
income and the accomplishment of the charity's
exempt purpose. Thus, unless a business activity
contributes importantly to the accomplishment of
a charity's exempt purpose, the business activity
is "unrelated" for purposes of the third part of
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activity is not exempt via § 513.48
F. Congressional Focus on Sponsor
Advertising by Charities as a Trade
or Business
In 1969, Congress once again faced a
problem regarding unfair competition spawned
by tax exemption. The problem was how to deal
with businesses that were carried on as part of a
complex of activities which, in the aggregate,
were carried on in the exercise of an exempt
function." Congress referred specifically to
advertising in tax-exempt periodicals,
magazines, and the like as a prime example of
the problem. 9 If the income generated by
selling such advertising by charities goes
untaxed, then charities have a distinct
commercial advantage over taxable entities
selling similar advertising.' Furthermore, this
advantage is caused solely by the status of the
favored entity as tax exempt.'
In an effort to solve this problem, Congress
enacted 26 U.S.C. § 513(c).42 Section 513(c)"
provides that an activity does not lose its identity
as a "trade or business" simply because it is
carried on within a larger aggregate of similar
related" activities which, in total, constitute a
charitable activity. 5 For example, even though
the National Collegiate Athletic Association's
Final Four Basketball Tournament is a charitable
event, any advertising done by NCAA on behalf
of a Final Four sponsor is a "trade or business"
activity.' Furthermore, although § 513(c) is
entitled "Advertising, Etc., Activities," it is clear
from the legislative history that it is intended to
cover all commercial exploitations of an exempt
function - not just advertising.47 Thus, the
three-part test outlined in the regulations may be
applied to one of a conglomerate of activities
within a business or to the extent that any
III. The Treasury's Treatment of
Sponsorship Payments as Taxable
Advertising Income (or Not) Over the
Past Few Years
A. Application of the Unrelated
Business Income Tax to
Sponsorship Payments
Generally, a sponsorship payment is a fee
paid to a charity for the purpose of funding an
event or activity conducted by the charity. This
article concerns the type of sponsorship
payments where the sponsor receives something
in return for sponsoring charitable events. The
Treasury Department estimates that such
payments for charitable events have increased at
an annualized rate of more than 20% over the
past decade, amounting to well over $3 billion in
recent years.49
Sponsorship payments are often made on
the condition that the payor receives some type
of return benefit from the tax-exempt event
organizer. This return benefit may be anything
from a simple expression of appreciation (i.e., a
mere acknowledgment), to a more complicated
"quid pro quo" arrangement involving specific
advertising requirements."0 Although the line
separating an acknowledgment from an
advertisement may be in dispute, the impact of
such a distinction is quite clear. If a sponsorship
payment is for a mere acknowledgment, the
payment is tax-free to the tax-exempt recipient."'
However, if the sponsorship payment is for an
advertising benefit, then the payment may be
taxable to the tax-exempt recipient. 2 Thus,
appropriate treatment of a sponsorship payment
as either payment for an acknowledgment or
payment for advertising is critical as far as the
tax-exempt organizer of a charitable event is
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concerned.
B. 1991: Treasury Issues Technical
Advice Memorandum Concluding
That Cotton Bowl Organizers
Advertised on Behalf of Sponsor
On August 16, 1991, the Treasury ruled
that sponsorship payments to the exempt
organizers of two college football bowl games
was for advertising and, thus, subject to
taxation." Technically, this technical advice
memorandum (TAM) only applies to the factual
situation involved therein and, therefore, may
not be cited as precedent.5 4 However, it has
potential wider implications. This TAM is one
of the few published rulings that is indicative of
the Treasury's inclination, at least during 1991,
to treat a wide variety of sponsorship payments
as for advertising as opposed to
acknowledgment. Thus, in addition to tax-
exempt bowl games, the Treasury's analysis of
the situation in this TAM may apply to other
situations as well.
In the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM,55 Mobil
Oil Corporation (Mobil) agreed, by contract, to
make sponsorship payments to the Cotton Bowl
Athletic Association (CBAA), a § 501(c)(3)
charity. The payments were made in relation to
CBAA's annual charitable event popularly
known as the "Cotton Bowl."' In return for the
sponsorship payment, CBAA agreed to do the
following:
1. Change the name of the Cotton Bowl
to the "Mobil Cotton Bowl."
2. Add the Mobil logo to the Cotton
Bowl logo and use both the new name and logo,
exclusively, on all Cotton Bowl press releases.
3. Imprint the new logo at a prominent
place at the site of the event.
4. During the event, display Mobil's
commercial messages on an electronic sign and
broadcast these messages over the public address
system.
5. Void the contract, at Mobil's option,
if the event is not televised.
6. Arrange for event tickets, hotel
rooms, and event-related activity tickets on
behalf of Mobil.5 7
In the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM, the
Treasury concluded that the ubit applied to the
sponsorship payments made by Mobil to CBAA.
The Treasury reasoned that the payments were
income from a "trade or business" because the
amount of return benefit to Mobil was
substantial and not a mere recognition by CBAA
of Mobil's payment.5 The Treasury rejected
CBAA's argument that the return benefit was
insubstantial because CBAA was required to
invest very little time, effort, or expense under
the contract. Instead, the Treasury recognized
that 'the value of the advertising services
rendered to Mobil by CBAA was
"commensurate" with the amount of money paid
by Mobil, indicating a prohibited "quid pro quo"
arrangement. 59
The Treasury also noted that the CBAA's
advertising trade or business was both unrelated
to CBAA's exempt educational purpose and
regularly carried on. The advertising business
was unrelated because neither adding Mobil's
logo nor the displaying of its commercial
message contributed importantly to CBAA's
exempt purpose.' Additionally, the advertising
activity was regularly carried on because it was
conducted over a relatively significant period of
time and was systematic and consistent.6 The
Treasury does not state whether both the time
CBAA spent soliciting Mobil's advertising
business and the time during which the
advertisement aired was counted in this
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
The Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations
"significant period of time." However, this is a
reasonable assumption given the Treasury's
positions in earlier cases where such solicitation
and preparation time was indeed considered.62
The Treasury's analysis and conclusions in
the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM regarding the
regularly carried on element of the § 1.513-1(a)
ubit test are also noteable.63 In 1991, the
Treasury and at least one federal circuit court
disagreed as to how to apply the regularly
carried on element to advertising at annual
charitable events.' The Treasury's position at
the time was to look at preparatory and
promotional efforts in conjunction with the
dissemination of the advertisement itself.6 5 The
Tenth Circuit chose to look to the dissemination
of the advertisement only.' The Treasury's
view is consistent with the ubit's stated goal of
lessening the competitive commercial advantage,
due solely to tax exemption, of charities over
taxable entities.67 An analysis which ignores
preparatory and promotional efforts ignores the
reality that taxable advertising businesses engage
in these very efforts in order to increase
advertising profits and revenues.6" The,
Treasury's position of considering preparatory
and promotional efforts recognizes this reality.
C. 1992: Treasury Issues Proposed
Audit Guidelines Reaffirming It's
1991 Position That Sponsorship
Income Would Be Taxed if
Significant Advertising is Performed
On January 17, 1992, just five months after
it issued the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM, the
Treasury issued proposed audit guidelines
regarding charitable event sponsorship
payments.69 The purpose of these guidelines was
to help Treasury personnel determine whether
the benefit to a charitable event sponsor was
more than a mere recognition of the sponsor's
generosity.70  Thus, the guidelines were
concerned, primarily, with the first element of
the § 1.5 13-1 (a) three-pronged test (i.e., whether
income is from a § 162 trade or business). It is
widely believed that the guidelines represented
the Treasury's response to the situation involved
in the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM.7'
The guidelines began by generally
providing that if the return benefit to a sponsor
is substantial, as opposed to insubstantial, the
sponsorship payments may be subject to the
ubit.72 However, the Treasury did not outline a
clear and concise rule for determining whether a
return benefit was substantial or not. Instead,
reflecting the approach used by the Treasury in
the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM, the guidelines
suggested analysis of a list of various factors for
this purpose. Some of the factors to be
examined included the value of the services
provided as a return benefit and the terms under
which the payments and services were
rendered."
Next, the guidelines stated that they did not
apply to purely local charities that received
"insignificant" sponsorship funds and operated
with "significant amounts" of volunteer labor.74
For example, the guidelines did not apply to
little league sports teams, local theaters, or youth
orchestras. The Treasury probably excluded
these smaller entities from coverage because
they offer little opportunity for the type of
commercially competitive abuse with which the
ubit is concerned. For the most part, these
smaller entities are more concerned with
covering costs than with making a profit and,
therefore, probably lack the required profit
motive. More importantly, however, the
guidelines were not limited solely to college
bowl games. Thus, by implication, they would
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apply to all charities that received sponsorship
money for charitable events.
Finally, the guidelines suggested specific
items that tax personnel should examine in
evaluating the significance of the return
benefit.7 5 Some of these items included the
contract,"6 if any, between the sponsor and the
charity ind videos,' if any, of the charitable
event for evidence of extensive sponsor
promotion. Also, the guidelines listed factors
such as use of the sponsor's name and logo in
the event title and displaying the sponsors
commercial message at the event as indicative of
an unrelated trade or business.7 This is a clear
indication that the guidelines were prompted by
the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM.
In general, the guidelines reaffirmed the
Treasury's position that arrangements involving
significant advertising benefits to the sponsor of
a charitable event will be looked at closely.
However, at least one commentator has argued
that the Treasury's focus for determining
"substantial return benefit" under the guidelines
was too broad.79  Under this argument the
Treasury should not have focused its attention in
the guidelines on both the charity's advertising
services provided and the sponsor's expected
return benefit. Instead, the argument continues,
the Treasury should, as suggested by the
Supreme Court in American Bar Endowment,"°
focus solely on the advertising services provided
when evaluating revenue for ubit purposes.
This argument ignores the fact that the
reason for the guidelines is to determine whether
a § 513 trade or business exists. In the case of a
sponsorship payment to a charity, the potential
trade or business is that of advertising for the
sponsor. Regardless of how one defines
"advertising," it must necessarily involve the
promotion or marketing of the sponsor's product
or service. In essence, if no agreement for
substantial promotion or marketing exists, then
there is probably no expectation of an
advertising benefit. On the other hand, if an
advertising trade or business exists, then it is the
promotion or marketing for which the sponsor
pays. Thus, the presence or absence of an
expectation by the sponsor of an advertising
benefit is critical in determining whether a
"substantial return benefit" exists.8 '
D. 1993: Treasury Issues Proposed
Regulation in which it Re-Defines
Advertising "Trade or Business" By
Example
On January 22, 1993, more than a year
after it issued the proposed audit guidelines, the
Treasury issued proposed regulations regarding
when sponsorship income is subject to tax.82
Like the proposed audit guidelines, proposed
regulation 1.513-4 addresses the issue of when
sponsorship of a charitable event satisfies the
"trade or business" element of the § 1.513-1 (a)
three-pronged test. However, unlike the
proposed audit guidelines, the proposed
regulation both defines the critical term
"advertising" and provides numerous examples
of what advertising is and what it is not.
8 3
Proposed Regulation § 1.513-4 defines
advertising as follows:
[A]ny message or other programming
material which is broadcast or otherwise
transmitted, published, displayed or
distributed in exchange for any
remuneration, and which promotes or
markets any company, service, facility or
product. Advertising includes any activity
which promotes or markets any company,
service, facility or product. Advertising
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does not include acknowledgments
described in [1.513-4(c)]."
Thus, at least according to the plain language of
the definition, if a charity's activity either
involves no promotion or marketing or if it fits
the 1.513-4(c) definition of "acknowledgment,"
it will not be considered advertising.
Presumably, this would result in a finding that
the ubit does not apply to the income generated
by the activity.
The Treasury chose to describe
"acknowledgment" as a "mere recognition of a
sponsor's payment." 5 This definition is not
much different than the Treasury's statements in
the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM and the proposed
audit guidelines that the return benefit is for
advertising if it is more than a mere insubstantial
return benefit. Accordingly, this definition
provides very little additional help, if any, in
determining when a sponsorship payment is for
an acknowledgment versus an advertisement.
Thus, for the most part, acknowledgments must
be determined by reviewing the many examples
and illustrations of the proposed regulation.
The first group of illustrations is an
apparent attempt by the Treasury to say that
simply displaying information that identifies a
sponsor, with nothing more, is an
acknowledgment.' Thus, use of the sponsor's
logos or slogans and displaying a sponsor's
location and telephone number are
acknowledgments so long as they do not
promote the sponsor's product or service.
Additionally, the Treasury provides in this first
group that value-neutral descriptions, displays,
and visual depictions of a sponsor's product or
service is an acknowledgment. The second
group of illustrations describes advertisements as
including messages that include qualitative or
comparative language, price information, calls to
action, an endorsement, or an inducement to buy,
rent, or sell. 7 Interestingly, the proposed
regulation states that distribution of free samples
of the sponsor's product at the sponsored event
is not an inducement to buy, sell, or rent. Thus,
apparently, such distribution is not advertising
at least for purposes of the ubit.
E. Evidence of the Treasury's
Chameleon-like Qualities When it
Comes to Treating Sponsor.
Promotion by Charities as
Advertising
Obviously, these definitions and
descriptions by the Treasury in its proposed
regulation represent a sharp departure from the
Treasury's pre- 1993 positions on the
sponsorship issue. Prior to 1993, the Treasury's
position was that a return benefit was substantial
if the sponsorship arrangement amounted to a
quid pro quo."8 Thus, if the value of services
rendered by the charity roughly equaled the
value of the payment received, the entire
sponsorship payment would likely be
categorized as for advertising.89
However, the Treasury has made an about-
face in its 1993 proposed regulation. The
proposed regulation permits several activities
which in the past were classified as advertising
to lose such classification. For example, the
mere use of a non-promotional logo may be
properly categorized as a mere acknowledgment.
But there should rarely, if ever, be an occasion
when a description, display, or depiction of a
sponsor's product or service is non-
promotional." Additionally, it would be
difficult to say, with a straight face, that a
distribution of free samples of the sponsor's
product at a charitable event is ever non-
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promotional. In each of these cases, a sponsor
would be engaging in the essence of advertising
and promotion - getting its product to the
customer so that the customer can try it. This is
clearly a complete reversal by the Treasury of its
pre-1993 position.
If there was any doubt about the Treasury's
change in position, such doubt disappears once
one analyzes Example 4 of the proposed
regulation. 9' Example 4 depicts a situation that
is virtually identical to the situation involved in
the Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM.92 In the Mobil
Cotton Bowl TAM, the Treasury decisively
ruled that such situations involving advertising at
college bowl games satisfy the "trade or
business" element of the § 1.513-1(a) three-
pronged test. However, in Example 4, the same
situation is classified as a mere acknowledgment
and not an advertisement.
Many commentators have likewise noticed
the Treasury's flip-flop.93 For example, some
have appropriately suggested that the Treasury
has "capitulated" to charities' and is "giving
away the store."' Others have observed that the
proposed regulations "correct egregious errors in
the proposed... guidelines."' Thus, regardless
of the view one takes of the reason for, or the
effect of, the Treasury's change in position, it is
undisputed that its position has indeed changed.
F. Possible Rationales for the
Service's Change of Heart
'Regarding Corporate Sponsorship
As is true with many government agency
actions, one could posit endlessly as to why the
Treasury did what it did in reversing its Mobil
Cotton Bowl decision. The powers that be in the
Treasury may have felt that this pre-1993
position was politically inexpedient. Indeed, at
the time the proposed regulation was published
in early 1993, Congress was considering
legislation that would have virtually invalidated
the Treasury's proposed audit guideline
position.' The stated purpose of the legislation
was to "ensure that [the] proposed audit
guidelines.., are never finalized." '9 Congress'
action is clearly a response to political pressure
from the "charitable community." In fact, the
sponsor of one piece of legislation that would
codify the proposed regulation states:
Hundreds of tax-exempt organizations of
all types - cultural, health, and sports -
from around the country submitted
comments opposing these guidelines out of
fear that they would not be able to attract
corporate funding for their exempt
activities and that the benefit of the funds
they do receive would be reduced."
Thus, the Treasury apparently issued the
proposed regulation because Congress was going
to do it anyway.
This is not the first time, and definitely not
the last time, that the Treasury has initiated rule-
making in anticipation of similar congressional
action. Interestingly, § 513(c) - the statute
under which the proposed regulation was
promulgated - came about in the same manner.
In 1967, the Treasury issued regulations
regarding fragmentation just prior to Congress,
in 1969, enacting legislation on the same
matter.1°°
IV. Conclusions About the Proposed
Regulation
A. The Practical Effect of the
Proposed Regulation
The most obvious effect of the proposed
regulation, if finalized, is that charities receiving
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
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sponsorship payments for charitable events will
be subject to less scrutiny. In fact, reports
indicate that both Treasury auditors and charities
are already relying on the proposed regulation.
For instance, the Treasury is reportedly refusing
to impose the ubit on scoreboard advertising by
corporate sponsors at various colleges and
universities.' 0 ' This refusal is, apparently, due to
the proposed regulation. Thus, the likelihood
that the Treasury will ever impose the ubit on
sponsorship payments is severely diminished by
the proposed regulation.
Sponsors, taxable advertisers, and the
Treasury itself may also feel the bite of this new
position in the proposed regulation. Sponsors
may now have an incentive to divert advertising
dollars away from taxable advertisers, such as
radio and television, and redirect these revenues
toward tax-exempt advertisers. Absent special
circumstances, the sponsor would likely reap the
same tax benefits whether its sponsorship
payment is classified as either a business
expense or a charitable contribution
deduction. 2 However, due to its tax-exempt
status, a charity could probably provide that
advertising benefit to the sponsor for less money
than a taxable entity could.0 3 Thus, the sponsor
benefits (and the Treasury loses) to the extent of
the charity's tax savings. Additionally, the
taxable advertiser loses to the extent of the lost
potential after-tax profits on the sponsor's
advertising business. This is the very problem
that Congress sought to eliminate when it
enacted the ubit."
B. The Legality of the Proposed
Regulation
1. A legal challenge to the
proposed regulation would
likely fail because it is not an
impermissible exercise of the
Treasury's rule-making power.
Aside from the practical effects of the
proposed regulation, one should also consider
the legality of the Treasury's regulatory
action.0 5 Specifically, even if the proposed
regulation adversely affects a taxpayer, that
taxpayer cannot have the proposed regulation
invalidated in court without showing that the
Treasury exceeded its legal bounds." 6 One
obvious possibility is to show that the proposed
regulation is an impermissible exercise of the
Treasury's rule-making power. 7  As the
following analysis demonstrates, this argument
would likely fail.
2. The proposed regulation's
definition of "advertising" is
"permissible" under § 513.
Pursuant to § 7805(a), the Secretary of the
Treasury is delegated general rule-making
authority to "prescribe all needful rules and
regulations" for the enforcement of the tax
laws.'08 The Treasury promulgated the proposed
regulation regarding sponsorship payments to
charities pursuant to this congressional grant of
general rule-making authority."'e Although such
interpretive regulations"0 do not have the force
and effect of law, they are generally subject to a
very high standard of judicial review."' Thus,
before a § 7805(a) interpretive regulation may
be invalidated as a violation of regulatory
authority, the reviewing court must make one of
two findings:
1) That the regulation is inconsistent
with Congress' clearly expressed statutory or
legislative intent, or
2) If the statute or legislative intent is
silent or ambiguous, that the regulation is not
based on a permissible interpretation of the
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statute." 2
What is apparent from this judicial
standard is that regulations - especially tax
regulations - that interpret terms not already
defined by statute or legislative history will
likely be upheld as valid." 3  Conversely,
regulations that interpret terms that have already
been defined by Congress - either in the statute
or through legislative history - are less likely to
survive judicial scrutiny." 4 Thus, the absence,
or presence, of a congressional definition of a
term that an agency interprets and defines by
regulation is often critical to deciding if the
regulation is a valid exercise of rule-making
power.
a. Chevron Case: An
agency's interpretive
regulations are entitled to
"strong deference" by
reviewing courts.
The Supreme Court recently outlined this
principle of "strong deference" to an agency's
interpretation of a statute in Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."'
Chevron involved the legality of a 1981
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulation" 6 promulgated under a provision of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
(CAAA). 1 7  The CAAA provision required
states not achieving certain air quality standards
to establish stringent permit programs for
regulation of new or modified major "stationary
sources" of air pollution."' The EPA regulation
implementing this permit requirement allowed
states to adopt a plant-wide definition of the term
"stationary source.""' 9 That is, the regulation
allowed states to treat all pollution-emitting
devices within the same plant as one "source."' 2
Pursuant to a judicial challenge, the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia set aside the EPA regulation as
"inappropriate" considering the CAAA's
purpose of improving air quality.' The
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
ruling.'22 Noting that the EPA regulation was
based on a "permissible" construction of the
CAAA, the Court differed with the appellate
court as to the appropriate standard of review for
EPA's regulatory action." The Court held that,
where Congress has not expressly or implicitly
addressed a statutory issue, an agency's rule
addressing that issue will be upheld if it is a
permissible interpretation of the statute. 24 The
permit program's purpose was to "accommodate
the conflict between the economic interest in
permitting capital programs and the
environmental interest in improving air
quality."'2 Recognizing that Congress failed to
accommodate these interests on the level of
specificity presented in the Chevron case, the
Court concluded that EPA's reasonable
accommodation would be upheld.'26
b. National Muffler Case:
An agency's interpretive
regulation will be upheld
by a reviewing court if it
reasonably implements a
congressional mandate.
The defining case in which the Supreme
Court outlined appropriate standards by which to
judge the Treasury's rule-making power under §
7805 is National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v.
United States.'27 National Muffler involved the
legality of a treasury regulation that defined the
term "business league" as used in § 501(c)(6) of
the Code. The taxpayer in National Muffler was
an association of franchisees for Midas Muffler
Company. The association sued the government
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
The Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations
in federal district court for refund of previously
paid federal income taxes on the ground that it
was improperly denied tax-exempt status as a §
501(c)(6) "business league."'' 2
The district court denied the association's
refund request, concluding that the Midas
franchisees do not constitute a "line of business"
under Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(6)-1.' 29
The court of appeals, noting the absence of
direct statutory guidance, affirmed the district
court ruling. The court reasoned that the
Treasury's line of business requirement is
consistent with the congressional intention that
the exemption apply to "organizations which
promote some aspect of the general economic
welfare rather than support particular private
interests."' 30
On review by writ of certiorari, the
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
conclusion that Treasury Regulation §
1.501(c)(6)-1 was valid. The Court stated that,
because the term "business league" has "no well-
defined meaning or common usage" outside of
tax law, it is the type of term that most
appropriately lends itself to interpretive
regulation. Under such circumstances, "if [the
regulation] is found to implement the
congressional mandate in some reasonable
manner," it must be upheld. 3 ' One element of
the congressional mandate supporting the
"business league" exemption was to exempt
organizations primarily purposed to promote
general business welfare!32 According to the
Court, the Treasury's conclusion that business
leagues should work towards "improvement of
business conditions of one or more lines of
business" is consistent with congressional
intention.
c. Application of Chevron
and National Muffler to
the corporate sponsorship
regulations
With regard to corporate sponsorship
payments, the proposed regulation represents the
Treasury's interpretation of what Congress
means in § 513 by the term "trade or business"
and, more specifically, "advertising" trade or
business. Although it has often referred to
advertising as being a primary object of the ubit,
Congress has never defined the term
"advertising" for purposes of § 513.
Additionally, until issuance of the proposed
regulation in 1993, J3 the regulations issued
under the statutes imposing the ubit (i.e., §§ 511-
514) did not define "advertising." Finally, § 513
is a federal taxing statute that the Treasury is
charged with administering. Accordingly,
pursuant to Chevron and National Muffler, the
Treasury is given wide latitude to, based upon its
technical and policy expertise, interpret
"advertising" in any permissible manner. 3 4
Presumably, a "permissible" and
"plausible" interpretation of "advertising" as a §
513 trade or business would include a range of
possibilities. For instance, one might conceive
of a definition of advertising that covers even the
slightest promotion or preference of a donor's
product or service. Accordingly, under this
conservative approach, any donation to a
charitable event which is recognized publicly by
the tax-exempt recipient (or anyone else), would
be for an advertising benefit.'35 At the other
extreme, one might imagine a situation in which
only the most egregious cases of promotion
would be classified as advertising. Such a case
might occur if the sponsor required, by contract
and as a condition of sponsorship, that the tax-
exempt recipient air a 30-minute television
commercial espousing the virtues of the
Fall 1996
Brennen
sponsor's product or service."
Admittedly, each of these definitions of
advertising is extreme and very unlikely to
emerge in any final version of the proposed
regulation. However, each of these definitions is
"plausible" in that neither of them contradicts
Congress' expressed desires regarding the ubit to
tax trade or business income. Furthermore, the
ubit regulatory scheme, as is true of most taxing
schemes, is technical and complex.'" Thus, so
long as the Treasury (in its final regulations)
considers advertising as a "trade or business" in
a "detailed and reasoned fashion" and chooses a
definition that reconciles "conflicting
policies,"'38 its determination will be upheld
under almost any scenario.
3. The Treasury's change in
position as to the definition of
"advertising" does not
invalidate the current definition.
As is apparent from this article, the
proposed regulation represents a change by the
Treasury of its position on what is, and what is
not, a "trade or business" for ubit purposes. One
might argue that a final regulation that represents
such a "sharp" break from the past should not
receive as much deference as is ordinarily
warranted under Chevron and National Muffler.
Arguably, a policy that has been in existence for
a matter of months may not be as sound as one
that has been tested for several years.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has held that
such changes do not result in less deference.
In Rust v. Sullivan,39 the Court, rejecting
the petitioner's argument, held that an agency's
interpretation of a statute is entitled to Chevron-
type deference despite its "sharp break" with
prior interpretations."i  Furthermore, the
Chevron Court, which also addressed this
changing interpretation issue, implied that such
changes are a necessary part of agency
administration:
The fact that the agency has from time to
time changed its interpretation of the term
"source" does not, as respondents argue,
lead us to conclude that no deference
should be accorded the agency's
interpretation of the statute. An initial
agency interpretation is not instantly
carved in stone. On the contrary, the
agency, to engage in informed rule-
making, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy
on a continuing basis.'4'
Finally, the Court in National Muffler
faced this same issue of the effect of a
"regulatory shift."'" The Court there rejected
the notion that the change necessarily results in
invalidity of the interpretation. Justice
Blackmun wrote "[w]e would be reluctant to
adopt the rigid view that an agency may not alter
its interpretation in light of administrative
experience." Thus, even though narrowing the
definition of "advertising" to exclude some
traditional advertising activities represents a
change in the Treasury's position, this change
does not eliminate the deference due under
Chevron and National Muffler.4 3
V. What Should the Treasury Do?
Even though the proposed regulation may
be legal, the Treasury should nevertheless revert
back to its pre-1993 position regarding its
treatment of corporate sponsorship payments.
Under this earlier position, if the sponsorship
arrangement was motivated by profit or was akin
to a "quid pro quo," the Treasury would rule that
The Kansas Journal of Law & Public Policy
The Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations
the trade or business element of the § 1.513-1 (a)
three-pronged test was satisfied. However, if the
benefit to the sponsor was no more than a mere
recognition of the contribution, then no ubit
would apply.
On the surface, it appears as if this type of
anticipatory rule-making by the Treasury is
contrary to an executive agency's non-legislative
role of executing, not writing, the law.'"
However, as the Chevron and National Muffler
analyses indicate, this type of agency action by
the Treasury does not result in improper rule-
making. On the other hand, avoiding illegality
should not be the only guide for an executive
agency. An agency's regulations should reflect
the reasonable expectations of those affected by
them. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.513-4
fails to reflect such reasonable expectations.
One would reasonably expect that an
arrangement primarily motivated by profit,
rather than charitable objectives, is a business
arrangement for both parties.'45 Accordingly,
such business arrangements should be taxable
for ubit purposes. However, the proposed
regulation excludes from the term "advertising"
(i.e., one type of trade or business) arrangements
that are, without a doubt, both promotional and
business-like. In particular, Example 4
(involving the Mobil Cotton Bowl sponsorship
arrangement) of the proposed regulation
eliminates any chance that proceeds from a bowl
game sponsor will ever be unrelated business
taxable income.
Admittedly, charities such as bowl game
organizers need money to survive. But one must
not lose sight of the fact that these games are,
allegedly, charitable events. As such, and in
keeping with ubit policy of not subsidizing
primarily commercial ventures, the Treasury
should ensure that even charities pay their fair
share of taxes. This article suggests that,
although the proposed regulation would not be
invalidated in a court challenge as an improper
exercise of regulatory authority, significant
advertising dollars will be diverted from taxable
entities to non-taxable entities as a result of its
promulgation. Furthermore, this diversion of
revenues occurs solely due to the non-taxable
entity's tax-exempt status. Accordingly, the
Treasury is creating the very situation that the
ubit should seek to avoid - unfair commercial
competition.
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1. This article will often refer to the Treasury
Department, even where the more appropriate
reference would be to the Internal Revenue Service.
This article will also refer to various sections of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U.S.C.) simply by
their section numbers for the sake of brevity.
2. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5690
(1993).
3. See § 513(a) (1994); see also Tax Reform Act
of 1969 at 1313, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487
(1969).
4. The proposed regulation attempts to distinguish
corporate sponsorship arrangements which constitute
mere acknowledgments from those that represent
payments for advertising. The phrase "mere
acknowledgment" is not defined in the proposed
regulation. Instead, several examples of
acknowledgments are given. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §
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1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993).
5. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993).
6. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993).
7. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993).
8. Although this article is primarily concerned
with the effect of classification of a sponsorship
payment on the charity/payee, the effect on the
sponsor/payor should not be ignored. If a
sponsorship payment is treated as advertising from the
payor's perspective, then the payor may be entitled to
a § 162 business expense deduction. On the other
hand, if the payment is treated as an acknowledgment
from the payor's perspective, then the payor may be
entitled to a § 170 charitable contribution deduction.
However, this does not necessarily mean that the
payor is indifferent as to the treatment of the payment
as has been suggested by at least one author. See
Frank James Vari, The Unrelated Business Income
Tax and Its Effects Upon Collegiate Athletics, 9
AKRON TAX J. 111 (1992). For example, the Treasury
may deny a payor's business expense deduction as
unreasonable and/or excessive. Also, a charitable
contribution deduction may be denied, in whole or in
part, if the payor's 170 contribution base is not
sufficient to support a full deduction. Thus, the payor
may be very concerned with the treatment of the
sponsorship payment as either a payment for
advertising or acknowledgment benefit.
9. See part III, F infra.
10. See Nathan Wirtschafter, Fourth Quarter
Choke: How the IRS Blew the Corporate Sponsorship
Games, 27 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 1465 (1994), for
a more exhaustive look at the policy concerns raised
by the Treasury's issuance of the proposed regulation.
11. The assumption is that, if the tax-exempt
organization was engaged in an advertising trade or
business, allowed deductions would be less than
adjusted gross income for ubit liability calculation
purposes.
12. Paul Streckfus, News Analysis: IRS Pre-
Inaugural Gift For Charities, 58 TAX NOTES 384
(Jan. 25, 1993).
13. The Sixteenth Amendment granted Congress
"power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from
whatever source derived .... U.S. Const. amend.
XVI.
14. See generally §§ 501-528 (subchapter F,
chapter 1, subtitle A) (1994). See also Rob Atkinson,
Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L.REV.
501 (1990), for a discussion of the various rationales
for granting tax-exemption to entities and
organizations described in § 501(c)(3) - often called
"public benefit organizations"; Henry Hansmann, The
Rationale for Exempting Nonprofit Organizations
from Corporate Income Taxation, 91 YALE L.J. 54,
95-96 (1981), for a discussion of rationales for
granting tax-exemption to tax-exempt organizations
not described in § 501(c)(3). These non-501(c)(3)
organizations are commonly referred to as mutual
benefit organizations because their income is
generally used for the mutual benefit of individual
members.
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(c) (1994). But note, the
entities to which tax deductible charitable
contributions may be made are not explicitly referred
to in § 170(c) as "tax-exempt" entities. However, the
descriptions of these entities are virtually identical to
the descriptions of entities described elsewhere in the
Code as being exempt from federal income taxation.
See generally, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (1994). For
example, the charitable entities described in §
170(c)(2) are almost exactly the same as those
described in § 501(c)(3). Additionally, the cemetery
companies described in § 170(c)(5) are very similar to
those described in § 501(c)(13). Thus, although not
explicitly stated, the structure of § 170(c) has the
effect of requiring that the entities to whom charitable
contributions are made be tax-exempt.
16. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994). Because they
receive this double benefit of both a tax exemption
and the right to receive tax-deductible contributions,
§ 501(c)(3) organizations have historically been
subject to greater scrutiny than other charities.
Accordingly, if a § 501(c)(3) organization has too
much bad (i.e., unrelated) income, it is in danger of
losing its highly regarded § 501(c)(3) status.
17. See Revenue Act of 1950: Hearing Before
House Ways and Means Committee, Vol I, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1950). The House Ways and
Means Committee report on the Revenue Act of 1950
states:
The problem at which the tax on unrelated
business income is directed here is primarily
that of unfair competition. The tax-free status
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of . . [charities] enables them to use their
profits tax-free to expand operations, while
their competitors can expand only with profits
remaining after taxes. Also, a number of
examples have arisen where these organizations
have, in effect, used their tax exemption to buy
an ordinary business. That is, they have
acquired the business with no investment on
their own part and paid for it in installments out
of subsequent earnings - a procedure which
usually could not be followed if the business
were taxable.
H. R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 36-37.
18. See C.F. Mueller Co. v. Commissioner, 190
F.2d. 120 (3d Cir. 1951). The Third Circuit in
Mueller held that the acquiring corporation
maintained its tax-exempt status regardless of its
method of obtaining funds.
19. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,
263 U.S. 578 (1924), in which the Supreme Court
first announced the "destination of income" doctrine.
In Trinidad, a religious organization's exempt status
was upheld even though it engaged in significant non-
religious activities (real estate investments, stock
investments, food sales, etc.) because of the Court's
recognition that "such religious activities cannot be
carried on without money."
20. 26 U.S.C. § 51 l(a) & (b) (1994). See also 26
U.S.C. § 512(b) and 513(a)(1-3) & (d-h) for
exceptions to this general rule.
21. See MICHAEL I. SANDERS, PARTNERSHIPS &
JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAX-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS (John Wiley & Sons, 1994), for a
discussion of current practical issues involving the
ubit. This book has been described as "an informative
and thorough guide to alternative means of furthering
an organization's charitable purposes." See Marlis
Carson, Guidance For Exempt Organization
Practitioners: The Latest on Partnerships and Joint
Ventures, 63 TAX NOTES 775 (May 9, 1994).
22. § 511 (a & b) provide:
(a)(l) Imposition of Tax
There is hereby imposed for each taxable year
on the unrelated business taxable income (as
defined in section 512) of every organization
described in paragraph (2) a tax computed as
provided in section 11. In making such
computation for purposes of this section, the
term "taxable income" as used in section 11
shall be read as "unrelated business taxable
income."
(2) Organizations Subject to Tax
The tax imposed by paragraph (1) shall apply in
the case of any organization (other than a trust
described in subsection (b) or an organization
described in section 501(c)(1)) which is
exempt, except as provided in this part or part
II (relating to private foundations), from
taxation under this subtitle by reason of section
501(a). The tax imposed by paragraph (1) shall
apply in the case of any college or university
which is an agency or instrumentality of any
government or any political subdivision
thereof, or which is owned or operated by a
government or any political subdivision
thereof, or by any agency or instrumentality of
one or more governments or political
subdivisions. Such tax shall also apply in the
case of any corporation wholly owned by one
or more such colleges or universities ....
(b) (1) Imposition of Tax
There is hereby imposed for each taxable year
on the unrelated business taxable income of
every trust described in paragraph (2) a tax
computed as provided in section 1(e). In
making such computation for purposes of this
section, the term "taxable income" as used in
section 1 shall be read as "unrelated business
taxable income" as defined in section 512.
(2) Charitable, etc., Trusts Subject to Tax
The tax imposed by paragraph (1) shall apply in
the case of any trust which is exempt, except as
provided in this part or part II (relating to
private foundations), from taxation under this
subtitle by reason of section 501(a) and which,
if it were not for such exemption, would be
subject to subchapter J (sec. 641 and following,
relating to estates, trusts, beneficiaries, and
decedents).
23. 26 U.S.C. § 512(a)(1) (1994) provides:
For purposes of this title, [e]xcept as otherwise
provided in this subsection, the term "unrelated
business taxable income" means the gross
income derived by any organization from any
unrelated trade or business (as defined in
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section 513) regularly carried on by it, less the
deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly
connected with the carrying on of such trade or
business, both computed with the modifications
provided in subsection (b).
Certain traditionally passive income items (e.g., §
512(b)(1) dividends and interest; § 512(b)(2)
royalties) and § 512(b)(3) rent are excluded from the
definition of unrelated business taxable income.
24. 26 U.S.C. § 513(a) (1994) provides:
The term "unrelated trade or business" means,
in the case of any organization subject to the
tax imposed by section 511, any trade or
business the conduct of which is not
substantially related (aside from the need of
such organization for income or funds or the
use it makes of the profits derived) to the
exercise or performance by such organization
of its charitable, educational, or other purpose
or function constituting the basis for its
exemption under section 501 (or, in the case of
an organization described in section
51 l(a)(2)(B), to the exercise or performance of
any purpose or function described in section
501(c)(3)), except that such term does not
include any trade or business -
(1) in which substantially all the work in
carrying on such trade or business is performed
for the organization without compensation; or
(2) which is carried on, in the case of an
organization described in section 501 (c)(3) or
in the case of a college or university described
in section 511 (a)(2)(B), by the organization
primarily for the convenience of its members,
students, patients, officers, or employees, or, in
the case of a local association of employees
described in section 501(c)(4) organized before
May 27, 1969, which is the selling by the
organization of items of work-related clothes
and equipment and items normally sold through
vending machines, through food dispensing
facilities, or by snack bars, for the convenience
of its members at their usual places of
employment; or
(3) which is the selling of merchandise,
substantially all of which has been received by
the organization as gifts or contributions.
25. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.513-1(a), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993), which provides, in part, that, unless a
specific exception of §§ 512 or 513 applies, gross
income of a covered tax exempt entity is includible in
the computation of unrelated business taxable income
if all three elements of this test are met.
26. See 26 U.S.C. § 513(a)(1-3) (1994), which
excludes from the term "trade or business" any trade
or business (1) in which substantially all of the work
in carrying on the trade or business is done for free;
(2) which is carried on primarily for the benefit of its
members, students, patients, officers, or employees; or
(3) which is, substantially, the selling of contributed
or gift property. Other exceptions are provided for
certain trade shows and state fairs, certain hospital
services, bingo games, pole rentals, and distributions
of low cost articles. See generally 26 U.S.C. §
513(d)-(h) (1994).
27. See 26 U.S.C. § 512(b) (1994). See also infra,
note 24.
28. The term "taxable income" is a term of art in
tax law. It is defined in the Internal Revenue Code,
generally, as gross income minus certain allowed
deductions. 26 U.S.C. § 63(a) (1994). Taxable
income is the dollar amount to which the appropriate
tax rate is applied.
29. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.513-1(b), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993), which provides, in part:
The primary objective of adoption of the
unrelated business income tax was to eliminate
a source of unfair competition by placing the
unrelated business activities of certain exempt
organizations upon the same tax basis as the
nonexempt business endeavors with which they
compete. On the other hand, where an activity
does not possess the characteristics of a trade or
business within the meaning of section 162,
such as when an organization send out low cost
articles incidental to the solicitation of
charitable contribution, the unrelated business
income tax does not apply since the
organization is not in competition with taxable
organizations. However, in general, any
activity of a section 511 organization which is
carried on for the production of income and
which otherwise possesses the characteristics
required to constitute "trade or business" within
the meaning of section 162 - and which, in
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addition, is not substantially related to the
performance of exempt functions - presents
sufficient likelihood of unfair competition to be
within the policy of the tax. Accordingly, for
purposes of section 513 the term "trade or
business" has the same meaning it has in
section 162, and generally includes any activity
carried on for production of income from the
sale of goods or performance of services ....
30. See U.S. v. American Bar Endowment, 477
U.S. 105, 110 (1986). See also Commissioner v.
Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23 (1987), where the Court
held that a full-time gambler who regularly made bets
solely for his own account was engaged in a § 162
trade or business because the primary purpose for
engaging in the gambling activity was for income or
profit. Accord West Virginia State Medical
Association v. Commissioner, 91 T.C. 651 (1988),
ajffd, 882 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. den., 110 S.
Ct. 839 (1990).
31. See 26 U.S.C. § 513(h) (1994), where Congress
has provided for a specific exemption from ubit for
income generated by the distribution of so-called low
cost articles.
32. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1), 58 Fed.
Reg. 5690 (1993), which provides, in part:
In determining whether trade or business from
which a particular amount of gross income
derives is "regularly carried on," within the
meaning of section 512, regard must be had to
the frequency and continuity with which the
activities productive of income are conducted
and the manner in which they are pursued.
This requirement must be applied in light of the
purpose of the unrelated business income tax to
place exempt organization business activities
upon the same tax basis as the nonexempt
business endeavors with which they compete.
Hence, for example, specific business activities
of an exempt organization will ordinarily be
deemed to be "regularly carried on" if they
manifest a frequency and continuity, and are
pursued in a manner, generally similar to
comparable commercial activities of nonexempt
organizations.
33. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1990).
34. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(2)(ii), 58
Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993).
35. Because this regularly carried on prong of the
test relies on potential, and not actual, competition,
this article rejects the notion that a short period of
competition with major taxable advertisers can be
ignored. But see National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,
914 F.2d at 1425.
36. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(1), 58 Fed.
Reg. 5690 (1993), which provides:
Gross income derives from "unrelated trade or
business," within the meaning of section
513(a), if the conduct of the trade or business
which produces the income is not substantially
related (other than through the production of
funds) to the purposes for which exemption is
granted. The presence of this requirement
necessitates an examination of the relationship
between the business activities which generate
the particular income in question - the
activities, that is, of producing or distributing
the goods or performing the services involved
- and the accomplishment of the
organization's exempt purposes.
37. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-
1(d)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993), which provides, in
part:
Trade or business is "related" to exempt
purposes, in the relevant sense, only where the
conduct of the business activities has causal
relationship to the achievement of exempt
purposes (other than through the production of
income); and it is "substantially related," for
purposes of section 513, only if the causal
relationship is a substantial one. Thus, for the
conduct of a trade or business from which a
particular amount of gross income is derived to
be substantially related to purposes for which
exemption is granted, the production or
distribution of the goods or the performance of
the services from which the gross income is
derived must contribute importantly to the
accomplishment of those purposes . . ..
Whether activities productive of gross income
contribute importantly to the accomplishment
of any purpose for which an organization is
granted exemption depends in each case upon
the facts and circumstances involved.
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38. It is unclear from the legislative history whether
the concern addressed by § 513(c) was whether the
activity was a business or whether it was exempt.
However, the concern of the Tax Reform Act of 1969
was to eliminate the perception of "unfairness" in the
tax laws. INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs, 1966-1970.
Accordingly, the concern that § 513(c) was directed
at was probably whether portions of overall exempt
activities could be taxed as though they were
conducted separately.
39. The House Report to the Tax Reform Act of
1969 provides:
Under this provision, it is anticipated that
advertising income from publications (whether
or not the publications are related to the exempt
purpose of the organization) will constitute
unrelated business income to the extent it
exceeds expenses related to the advertising,
and, if the editorial aspects of publication are
carried on at a loss, to the extent it exceeds this
loss....
Where an unrelated business activity, such as
the sale of advertising in a publication of a tax-
exempt organization, or other commercial
exploitation of the exempt function .... the
Secretary or his delegate is to prescribe
regulations respecting the allocation of income
and expenses and other deductions which are
attributable to the unrelated activity so as to
clearly reflect unrelated business taxable
income from such activity, and to prevent
avoidance of unrelated business income tax
liability.
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1, 50 (1969), reprinted in
INTERNAL REVENUE AcTs, 1966-1970, supra note 39,
1343-44.
40. It is assumed throughout this article that
advertising is always a trade or business, whether it is
done on a daily, weekly, monthly, or annual basis. At
least one commentator suggests that the assumption
that, for ubit purposes, advertising is always a "trade
or business" applies only to advertising in daily,
weekly, or monthly journals. As regards
advertisements in programs for annual charitable
events, the commentator suggests a facts and
circumstances approach to determining if a "trade or
business" for ubit purposes exists. See Elizabeth
Magin, Advertising, the Unrelated Business Income
Tax, and National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Commissioner, 7 ExEMPT ORGS. TAX REV. 209 (Feb.
1993).
41. This article often refers to charities as being
"favored" in the sense that they generate income
without incurring a corresponding income tax
obligation. However, charities are also favored, in
many instances, by not having to pay sales or property
taxes on goods or property purchased to conduct the
business or sold by the business. But note, some
states, such as Florida, limit the use of these sales and
property tax benefits to only some of the § 501(c)
charities. FLA. STAT. ch. 212.08(7)(o)2a-d (Supp.
1996).
42. 26 U.S.C. § 513(c) provides:
For purposes of this section, the term "trade or
business" includes any activity which is carried
on for the production of income from the sale
of goods or the performance of services. For
purposes of the preceding sentence, an activity
does not lose identity as a trade or business
merely because it is carried on within a larger
aggregate of similar activities or within a larger
complex of other endeavors which may, or may
not, be related to the exempt purposes of the
organization. Where an activity carried on for
profit constitutes an unrelated trade or business,
no part of such trade or business shall be
excluded from such classification merely
because it does not result in profit.
43. 26 U.S.C. § 513(c) is a codification of Treas.
Reg. § 1.513-1(b), promulgated on December 12,
1967 and cited by Congress as the reason for
enactment of § 513(c). H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1,
at 50.
44. The term "related" refers to activities that are
related to the purpose for which the entity was
granted its tax exemption. See H.R. REP. No. 91-413
at 46.
45. See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) & (d)(3).
46. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 914 F.2d 1417, 1420 (10th Cir. 1990)
(recognizing that program advertising for sponsors of
the Final Four Basketball Tournament is a trade or
business activity but is not subject to tax because the
activity is not regularly carried on).
47. H.R. REP. No. 91-413, pt. 1, at 50.
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48. In § 1.513-1 (b) the Treasury gives an example
of a pharmacy in a hospital selling prescription drugs
to both the general public and to the hospital's
patients. The fact that all of the drugs are sold in one
overall pharmacy business does not prevent the
Treasury from fragmenting the pharmacy into two
businesses - one selling to the public and one selling
to patients. Since selling to patients is exempt under
§ 513(a), then only the sales to the general public
generate trade or business income that is potentially
subject to the ubit.
49. James McGovern, Service's McGovern
Explains Proposed Corporate Sponsorship
Regulations, 58 TAX NOTES 795 (Feb. 8, 1993). The
annualized growth rate and the $3 billion figure were
derived from information provided by the Internal
Revenue Service through its associate chief counsel,
James McGovern, on February 3, 1993, to the ABA
Taxation Section. The actual figures given were that
payments to sponsored events have "grown from $400
million in 1984 to $3 billion in recent years."
50. See generally Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007,
9147007 WL, at *4 (Aug. 16, 1991).
51. 26 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1994).
52. 26 U.S.C. § 511(a) (1994).
53. Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, 9147007 WL, at
*8 (Aug. 16, 1991).
54. 26 U.S.C. §61100)(3) (1994).
55. It is widely believed that the two bowl games
involved in Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 were the
"Mobil Cotton Bowl" and the "John Hancock Bowl."
See David A. Haimes, Corporate Sponsorships of
Charity Events and the Unrelated Business Income
Tax: Will Congress or the Courts Block the IRS Rush
to Sack the College Football Bowl Games?, 67
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1079 n. I (1992). Thus, for easy
reference,this article will refer to Tech. Adv. Mem.
91-47-007 as the "Mobil Cotton Bowl TAM."
56. Although the exact amount of the sponsorship
fee is unknown, the contract reportedly provided that
the fee would be increased if the event received a
Nielsen television rating above a certain level. Paul
Streckfus, A Glimpse of Mobil-Cotton Bowl Contract
Provisions, 55 TAX NOTES 447 (April 27, 1992).
57. Id.
58. In the context of defining a "contribution or
gift" for purposes of the § 170 charitable contribution
deduction, the Treasury has ruled that if the return
benefit is insubstantial the deduction will be allowed.
Thus, where the only return benefit to a contributor is
the privilege of being associated with, or being known
as a benefactor of, a tax exempt entity, the benefit is
insubstantial. See Rev. Rul. 68-432, 1968-2 C.B.
104. Otherwise, the Treasury's position is that it will
be presumed not to be a contribution or gift. See
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, 9147007 WL, at *7.
Similarly, in the context of deciding whether a tax
exempt-entity has exploited its exempt purpose, the
Treasury has ruled that a simple statement that a
charitable event has been paid for by the sponsor is
not exploitative. See Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B.
187, 188; Rev. Rul. 77-367, 1977-2 C.B. 193, 194.
59. See Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680,
690 (1989).
60. This article assumes this to be the Treasury's
rationale for finding a lack of substantial relationship.
The actual language of the TAM that addresses this
issue provides:
The Organization's activities are not
substantially related to its exempt function.
Neither the addition of the . . . nor the
displaying of... contributes importantly to the
Organization's educational purpose.
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007, 9147007 WL, at *6-7.
61. Presumably, the "significant period of time"
referred to by the Treasury here refers to a period of
at least three months. See Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2
C.B. 190, 191, cited in Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007,
9147007 WL, at *4 (ruling that three months of
advertising solicitation was "extensive" and "typical
of commercial endeavors."
62. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Commissioner, 914 F.2d at 1422 (stating that the
Treasury argued that both time spent soliciting and
preparing program advertisements and time during
which the programs are distributed should count in
determining "regularly carried on").
63. True, the CBAA's arguments against the trade
or business element and the unrelated element were
not totally baseless. Nevertheless, the Treasury's
rejection of these arguments was consistent with the
Supreme Court's earlier decisions in this area. See
generally United States v. American Bar
Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 118 (1986); United States
v. American College of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834
(1985). See also Domenique Comach, NCAA v.
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Commissioner of I.R.S.: When will the Internal
Revenue Service Consider an Activity Regularly
Carried On?, 19 J.C. & U.L. 39, 41-42 (1992)
(discussing generally how the term "regularly carried
on" is used in the context of university advertising).
64. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 914 F.2d at
1417.
65. Id. at 1422; Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190.
66. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 914 F.2d at
1424.
67. See e.g., Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1).
68. See Rev. Rul. 73-424, 1973-2 C.B. 190.
69. See I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B.
51.
70. Id.
71. Haimes, supra note 55, 1079 n.l.
72. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.1(1).
73. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.1(3).
74. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.2.
75. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.3.
76. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.3(3).
77. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.3(2).
78. I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, § 178.3(3)(a).
79. The commentator suggests as follows:
The IRS should revise the substantial return
benefit factors to concentrate solely on the
exempt organization and the actual services the
exempt organization provided to the corporate
sponsor. The IRS should include only the first
and fourth factors in the final guidelines: "the
value of the service provided [by the exempt
organization] in exchange for the payment" and
"whether the extent of the [exempt]
organization's exposure of the donor's name
constitutes significant promotion." When
evaluating, these factors, the IRS should
concentrate only on the services the exempt
organization provided.
David A. Haimes, supra note 55, 1104-05.
80. 477 U.S. at 109-16.
81. A focus on the "expectations" of the
sponsor/contributor is also consistent with gift
analysis for income tax purposes. See Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278
(1960) (holding that the most critical factor in
determining whether a payment was a gift is the
intentions (i.e., expectations) of the donor (i.e.,
sponsor)).
82. See generally Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58
Fed. Reg. 5690 (1990).
83. Proposed Treasury Regulation § 1.513-4 states
that it does not apply to advertising in exempt
organization periodicals. "Periodicals" is defined as
including regularly scheduled and printed material
that is both unrelated to a charitable event and not
distributed in connection with such event. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(a), 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993).
See also Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(f), 58 Fed.
Reg. 5687 (1993) for advertising in exempt
organization periodicals.
84. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(b), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993). Notably, this definition of advertising
is consistent with the basic notion that advertising
includes any form, or type, of promotion or marketing
in exchange for payment.
85. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(1), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993).
86. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g), 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993). Thus, under the proposed regulation, a
naming gift alone - such as would have been the
case if Mobil simply gave the sponsorship payment to
the CBAA on the condition that the Cotton Bowl be
re-named the Mobil Cotton Bowl - will continue to
be classified as an acknowledgment.
87. Id.
88. See generally Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007,
9147007 WL (Aug. 16, 1991).
89. Id. See also, I.R.S. Announcement 92-15, §
178.1.
90. But see Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(g) ex. 3, 58
Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993), which provides as follows:
0 organizes sports tournaments for local
charities across the country that are
underwritten by an auto manufacturer. 0
acknowledges the sponsored payment by
including the manufacturer's name and logo in
the title of the tournament and displaying the
manufacturer's name and logo on signs,
scoreboards and other printed material. The
auto manufacturer receives complimentary
admission passes and pro-am playing spots.
Additionally, 0 displays the latest models of
the sponsor's premier luxury cars in the
tournament area. O's activities are
acknowledgments of the payment and not
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advertising
91. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.513-4(g) ex. 4, 58
Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993), which provides as follows:
P conducts an annual college football bowl
game. P sells to commercial broadcasters the
right to broadcast the bowl game on television
and radio. A major corporation agrees to be the
exclusive sponsor of the bowl game. The
sponsorship payment includes amounts to be
paid to the colleges participating in the bowl
game. The detailed contract between P and the
corporation provides that the name of the bowl
game will include the name of the corporation.
The contract further provides that the
corporation's name and a special logo will
appear on players' helmets and uniforms, on
the scoreboard and stadium signs, on the
playing field, on cups used to serve drinks at
the game, and on all related printed material
distributed in connection with the game. The
sponsorship agreement is contingent upon the
game being broadcast on television and radio,
but the amount of the sponsorship payment is
not contingent upon the number of people
attending the game or the television ratings.
The contract provides that television cameras
will focus on the corporation's name and logo
on the field at certain intervals during the game.
P's activities are acknowledgments of the
payments and not advertising
92. See generally Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007,
9147007 WL (Aug. 16, 1991). Some of the
differences between the situations in the Mobil Cotton
Bowl TAM and Example 4 are as follows:
(1) the amount of the sponsorship payment by
Mobil, but not by P, was contingent on the
event receiving a specified rating,
(2) the actual payment itself was voidable by
Mobil, but not by P, if the event was not
televised, and
(3) a portion of the payment by P, but not by
Mobil, was to be paid directly to the colleges
participating in the event.
93. See generally, Paul Streckfus, supra note 13;
James McGovern, Service's McGovern Explains
Proposed Corporate Sponsorship Regulations, 58
TAX NoTEs 795 (Feb. 8, 1993); Milton Cerny, Letter
to the Editor: Sponsorship Regs Deserve Cheers, Not
Boos, 61 TAX NOTES 125 (Oct. 4, 1993).
94. One commentator said the following:
The IRS, perhaps a bit disingenuously, began a
January 19 News Release (IR-93-3) with this
statement: "The Internal Revenue Service said
regulations it proposed today give clear
guidance to tax exempt organizations such as
college football bowls, museums and
symphonies on the tax treatment of corporate
sponsorship payments they receive." A more
to-the-point opening might have been: 'The
IRS today capitulated to college football bowls,
museums and symphonies and will rarely, if
ever, tax them on advertising payments they
receive as part of a corporate sponsorship
arrangement." (emphasis in original).
Paul Streckfus, supra note 12, at 384.
95. James McGovern, supra note 93, at 796
(discussing an earlier Tax Notes article entitled 'The
Goldberg Variations, or Giving Away the Store").
96. Milton Cerny, supra note 94, at 125.
97. See, e.g., S. 1171, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993),
which, in part, provides:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled,
Section 1. Exclusion From Unrelated Business
Income For Certain Sponsorship Payments.
In General. - Section 513 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (Relating to unrelated
business taxable income) is amended by adding
at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
TREATMENT OF CERTAIN SPONSORSHIP
PAYMENTS. -
(1) In General. - The term 'unrelated trade or
business' does not include the activity of
soliciting and receiving qualified sponsorship
payments with respect to any qualified public
event.
(2) Qualified Sponsorship Payments. - For
purposes of this subsection, the term 'qualified
sponsorship payment' means any payment by
any person engaged in a trade or business with
respect to which there is no arrangement or
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expectation that such person will receive any
substantial return benefit other than -
(A) The use of the name or logo of such
person's trade or business in connection with
any qualified public event under arrangements
(including advertising) in connection with such
event which acknowledge such person's
sponsorship or promote such person's products
or services, or
(B) The furnishing of facilities, services, or
other privileges in connection with such event
to individuals designated by such person.
98. 139 CONG. REC. S 8234 (daily ed. June 22,
1993) (statement of Sen. Breaux). See also 139
CONG. REC. E 1010 (daily ed. April 22, 1993)
(statement by Rep. Brewster) for similar comments
regarding the House companion bill to S. 1171 (H.R.
1551, 103d Cong., 1st Sess (1993)).
99. 139 CONG. REC. S 8234, 8235.
100. See infra note 43.
101. See Paul Streckfus, News Analysis: Are
Universities Winning the Battle Against UBIT?, 62
TAX NOTES 953 (Feb. 21, 1994), stating the
following:
Colleges and universities had been concerned
that scoreboard advertising, whether in
fieldhouses or stadiums, would be subject to
the unrelated business income tax. However,
the IRS apparently is now accepting one or
more of the following arguments for a 'no tax'
result: that any scoreboard advertising qualifies
under the proposed corporate sponsorship
regulations; that any advertising escapes UBIT
because it is not regularly carried on (for
example, the IRS reportedly accepted this
argument to exempt scoreboard advertising in
a college football stadium because there were
only five home games); that the advertising
payments qualify as royalties; or that the
advertising payments qualify as rental
payments. Most colleges are making all of
these arguments, and recent reports indicate the
IRS is conceding the advertising issue on audit.
102. For illustrative purposes, this article ignores
additional intangible benefits to the sponsor of being
viewed by potential customers as a "good" company
for contributing to a charity.
103. If all variables are equal for a given advertising
arena, a tax-exempt advertiser could, to the extent of
any foregone income tax, provide service to a sponsor
at a lower rate than a taxable advertiser.
104. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-
172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969).
105. For additional discussion of the limitations on
the Treasury's legal authority to do what it does by
way of regulation and revenue ruling, see generally,
Charles J. Cooper, et al., The Legal Authority of the
Department of the Treasury to Promulgate a
Regulation Providing for Indexation of Capital
Gains, 12 VA. TAX REV. 631 (Spring 1993); Linda
Galler, Judicial Deference to Revenue Rulings:
Reconciling Divergent Standards, 56 OHIO STATE L.
J. 1037 (1995); Paul Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mammas
Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to be Tax Lawyers,
13 VA. TAX REV. 517 (1994); Paul Caron, Tax
Myopia Meets Tax Hyperopia: The Unproven Case
of Increased Judicial Deference To Revenue Rulings,
57 OHIO ST. L. J. 637 (1996).
106. This article implicitly assumes that one would
have appropriate standing to challenge the proposed
regulation so that a substantive challenge could occur.
However, the question of standing itself is a not so
insignificant hurdle to a successful challenge.
107. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), for the
general standard by which all agency actions are
judged as either permissible or not permissible.
108. 26 U.S.C. § 7805(a) (1994) provides:
Except where such authority is expressly given
by this title to any person other than an officer
or employee of the Treasury Department, the
Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title,
including all rules and regulations as may be
necessary by reason of any alteration of law in
relation to internal revenue.
109. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4, 58 Fed. Reg.
5690 (1993).
110. Generally, there are three types of tax
regulations: (1) legislative regulations; (2)
interpretive regulations; and (3) procedural
regulations. Legislative regulations emanate from a
specific and express statutory direction by Congress.
Interpretive regulations emanate from the Treasury's
§ 7805(a) general regulatory power. Finally,
procedural regulations are merely directive in nature.
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Theoretically, each of the various types of regulations
is believed to be subject to a different standard of
judicial review. For instance, legislative regulations
are believed to be subject to the highest standard of
review and, accordingly, are believed to have the
force and effect of law. On the other hand,
interpretive regulations are subject to a somewhat
lower standard of review than legislative regulations.
Reviewing courts ordinarily give strong deference to
an agency's interpretive regulations.
11. See generally Chevron v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
112. Id. at 843-44. Although the Chevron case deals
with regulations promulgated by the Environmental
Protection Agency, its reasoning is consistent with
that found in cases involving the Treasury's rule-
making authority. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel
Fertilizer Company, 455 U.S. 16 (1982); Rowan
Companies, Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247
(1981); National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc., v.
United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979); Fulman v. United
States, 434 U.S. 528 (1978); O'Neill V. United
States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969). Accord David
F. Shores, Deferential Review of Tax Court
Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 49 TAx LAWYER 629,
667 (Spring 1996).
113. See, e.g., National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc.
v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979) (concluding
that treasury regulation interpreting the term
"business league," which was not defined by
Congress, as an organization whose activities are
directed to improvement of business conditions of one
or more lines of business is valid because it bears a
fair relationship to the language and purposes of the
statute); Fulman v. United States, 434 U.S. 528
(1978) (concluding that a treasury regulation adopting
a rule of valuation of a distribution of appreciated
property for purposes of the personal holding
company tax was valid, especially given that
Congress failed to provide for such a rule in the
Internal Revenue Code).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co.,
455 U.S. 16 (1982) (concluding that a Treasury
Regulation interpreting Congress' statutory definition
of the term "brother-sister controlled group" to mean
that each shareholder need not hold stock in each
corporation was invalid as not being a reasonable
interpretation of the statute in light of its language,
structure, and legislative history); Rowan Companies,
Inc. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247 (1981)
(concluding that treasury regulations interpreting
Congress' statutory definition of "wages" in FICA
and FUTA to include value of meals and lodging were
invalid, for failing to implement statutory definition
in a consistent or reasonable manner); O'Neill V.
United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969)
(concluding that a Treasury Regulation which
interpreted Congress' existing definition of the term
"corporation" so as to exclude certain state
corporations was invalid and entitled to no weight
because it was plainly inconsistent with the statute
and constituted an attempt by the Treasury to
legislate).
115. Commenting on this point, the Supreme Court
has said that considerable weight should be accorded
to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer. See
Aluminum Co. of America v. Central Lincoln
Peoples' Util. Dist., 467 U.S. 380 (1984).
116. 40CFR § 51.165(a)(1)(i)&(ii) (1995).
117. Pub. L. No. 95-95,91 Stat. 685 (1977).
118. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.
119. Pursuant to 40 CFR § 51.18(a)(l)(i)&(ii)
(1995), "stationary source," and its related terms, are
defined as follows:
(i) Stationary source means any building,
structure, facility, or installation which emits or
may emit any air pollutant subject to regulation
under the [Clean Air] Act.
(ii) Building, structure, facility, or
installation means all of the pollutant-emitting
activities which belong to the same industrial
grouping, are located on one or more
contiguous or adjacent properties, and are
under the control of the same person (or
persons under common control) except the
activities of any vessel.
120. Thus, an existing plant with several polluting
devices could modify one such device without
meeting the permit requirements if the modification
did not increase overall emissions from the plant.
121. See National Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Gorsuch, 222 U.S. App. D.C. 268, 685 F.2d 718
(1982). The appellate court recognized that the
CAAA provision was silent as to Congress' definition
of "stationary source" - both in the statute and in
the legislative intent. Accordingly, the court looked
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to the purpose of the CAAA's nonattainment program
for guidance. Although it believed that the
"bubbling" concept of the regulation was mandatory
for programs maintaining air quality, the appellate
court held that "bubbling" was inappropriate for
improving air quality. Id. at 276, 685 F.2d at 726.
122. The Chevron Court states:
[I]t is clear that the Court of Appeals
misconceived the nature of its role in reviewing
the regulations at issue. Once it determined,
after its own examination of the legislation, that
Congress did not actually have an intent
regarding the applicability of the bubble
concept to the permit program, the question
before it was not whether in its view the
concept is "inappropriate" in the general
context of a program designed to improve air
quality, but whether the Administrator's view
that it is appropriate in the context of this
particular program is a reasonable one.
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.
123. Id. at 842-43, provides:
When a court reviews an agency's construction
of the statute which it administers, it is
confronted with two questions. First, always, is
the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the
court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be
necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the court is whether the
agency's answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
124. Id. at 843-44, states:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such
legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes
the legislative delegation to an agency on a
particular question is implicit rather than
explicit. In such a case, a court may not
substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made
by the administrator of the agency.
125. Id. at 851.
126. The Court states:
In these cases, the Administrator's
interpretation represents a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing
interests and is entitled to deference: the
regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the
agency considered the matter in a detailed and
reasoned fashion, and the decision involves
reconciling conflicting policies. Congress
intended to accommodate both interests, but did
not do so itself on the level of specificity
presented in this case. Perhaps that body
consciously desired the Administrator to strike
the balance at this level, thinking that those
with great expertise and charged with
responsibility for administering the provision
would be in a better position to do so; perhaps
it simply did not consider the question at this
level; and perhaps Congress was unable to
forge a coalition on either side of the question,
and those on each side decided to take their
chances with the scheme devised by the agency.
For judicial purposes, it matters not which of
these things occurred.
Id. at 865 (footnotes omitted).
127. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
128. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(6) exempts from the federal
income tax:
Business leagues, chambers of commerce,
real-estate boards, boards of trade, or
professional football leagues (whether or not
administering a pension fund for football
players), not organized for profit and no part of
the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
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of any private shareholder or individual.
129. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 provides:
A business league is an association of persons
having some common business interest, the
purpose of which is to promote such common
interest and not to engage in a regular business
of a kind ordinarily carried on for profit. It is
an organization of the same general class as a
chamber of commerce or board of trade. Thus,
its activities should be directed to the
improvement of business conditions of one or
more lines of business as distinguished from the
performance of particular services for
individual persons .... A stock or commodity
exchange is not a business league, a chamber of
commerce, or a board of trade within the
meaning of section 501(c)(6) and is not exempt
from tax.
130. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n, Inc. v. United
States, 440 U.S. at 475-476.
131. Id. at 476.
132. Id.at481.
133. Generally, that definition provides that
advertising is any message that promotes or markets
a company's goods or services. See generally Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(b), 58 Fed. Reg. 5690 (1993).
134. A court reviewing a regulation promulgated
under 26 U.S.C. § 513 "need not conclude that the
agency construction was the only one it permissibly
could have adopted to uphold the construction."
Chevron v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. at 843 n.1 1. Instead, the Treasury's
construction "may not be disturbed as an abuse of
discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the
plain language of the statute and does not otherwise
conflict with Congress' expressed intent." Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 184 (1991).
135. Under this approach, virtually all sponsorship
payments would constitute UBTI. Accordingly, a
charity's incentive for conducting charitable events
would be severely limited.
136. While under this approach very few, if any,
sponsorship payments would constitute UBTI, other
side effects may hinder sponsorships of charitable
events. For instance, although the proceeds to the
charity may not be taxed as UBTI, they would likely
lose their character as § 170 charitable contributions.
137. Regarding the complexity of the ubit law in
particular one Congressman has said:
Mr. Chairman, as I stated in my testimony
before the committee, it would be
presumptuous of me to pose as an expert on tax
laws and the various proposals for reforming
our Revenue Code. I know that this subject is
very complicated and technical.
See 115 Cong. Rec. H22733-34 (daily ed. August 7,
1969)(statement of Rep. Zablocki).
138. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
139. In Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
regulations that restricted abortion-related activities.
The petitioners in Rust argued that "the regulations
are entitled to little or no deference because they
'reverse a long-standing agency policy... ' and thus
represent a sharp break from the Secretary's prior
construction of the statute." 500 U.S. at 186.
140. Id.
141. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-864.
142. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n., Inc. v. United
States, 440 U.S. at 485.
143. If an agency changes from a previous
interpretation, the agency must provide a reasoned
analysis for the change. However, if the new agency
policy is supported by a reasoned analysis, it is
entitled to no less judicial deference than the old
policy. See generally Charles J. Cooper, et. al., supra
note 105.
144. Accord Paul Streckfus, Corporate Sponsorship
Sellout Puts Integrity of IRS at Risk, 60 TAx NOTES
1641 (Sept. 20, 1993).
145. This was true in the case of the Cadillac given
to Duberstein in anticipation of future business
referrals. See Commisioner of Internal Revenue v.
Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
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